

Topic:- DU\_J18\_MA\_ECO

- 1) Let  $\mathfrak{R}$  be the set of real numbers and  $f : \mathfrak{R} \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$  be a continuous and concave function. Which of the following statements is correct?

**[Question ID = 6976]**

1.  $|f|$  must be concave [Option ID = 27896]
2.  $-f$  must be concave [Option ID = 27895]
3.  $f + f$  must be concave [Option ID = 27898]
4.  $f \circ f$  must be concave [Option ID = 27897]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $f + f$  must be concave [Option ID = 27898]

- 2) The maximum value of  $f(x, y) = (xy)^{1/2}$ , subject to  $|x| \geq |y|$  and  $|x| + |y| \leq 1$ , is

**[Question ID = 6977]**

1. 1 [Option ID = 27901]
2. 2 [Option ID = 27902]
3. 0.5 [Option ID = 27900]
4. 0.25 [Option ID = 27899]

**Correct Answer :-**

- 0.5 [Option ID = 27900]

- 3) Consider an exchange economy with two agents, 1 and 2, and two goods,  $X$  and  $Y$ . Each agent's consumption set is  $\mathfrak{R}_+^2$ . The endowments of agents 1 and 2 are  $(10, 1)$  and  $(0, 9)$  respectively. (In any commodity bundle, the first entry is a quantity of  $X$  and the second one is a quantity of  $Y$ .)

If  $a > c$ , or  $a = c$  and  $b > d$ , then Agent 1 strictly prefers bundle  $(a, b)$  to  $(c, d)$ .

If  $b > d$ , or  $b = d$  and  $a > c$ , then Agent 2 strictly prefers bundle  $(a, b)$  to  $(c, d)$ .

Which of the following allocations is a competitive equilibrium allocation?

**[Question ID = 7047]**

1. 1 gets  $(10, 1)$  and 2 gets  $(0, 9)$  [Option ID = 28179]
2. None of the above [Option ID = 28182]

3. 1 gets (10, 10) and 2 gets (0, 0) [Option ID = 28180]
4. 1 gets (5, 5) and 2 gets (5, 5) [Option ID = 28181]

**Correct Answer :-**

4) Let  $\mathfrak{R}$  be the set of real numbers and let  $\mathcal{D}$  be the set of functions  $d : \mathfrak{R} \times \mathfrak{R} \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$  that satisfy the following properties for all  $x, y, z \in \mathfrak{R}$ :

- $d(x, y) \geq 0$
- $d(x, y) = 0$  if and only if  $x = y$
- $d(x, y) = d(y, x)$
- $d(x, z) \leq d(x, y) + d(y, z)$

Which of the following is not a function in  $\mathcal{D}$ ?

**[Question ID = 6975]**

1.  $d(x, y) = \min\{|x - y|, 1\}$  [Option ID = 27893]
2.  $d(x, y) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } x = y \\ 1, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$  [Option ID = 27892]
3.  $d(x, y) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } |x - y| \leq 1 \\ 1, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$  [Option ID = 27894]
4.  $d(x, y) = |x - y|$  [Option ID = 27891]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $d(x, y) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } |x - y| \leq 1 \\ 1, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$  [Option ID = 27894]

5) Let  $f : [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$  be twice differentiable. Suppose that the line segment joining the points  $(0, f(0))$  and  $(1, f(1))$  intersects the graph of  $f$  at a point  $(a, f(a))$ , where  $0 < a < 1$ . Then,

**[Question ID = 6980]**

1. there exists  $z \in [0, 1]$  such that  $f'(z) = 0$ . [Option ID = 27912]
2. there exists  $z \in [0, 1]$  such that  $f''(z) = |f(1) - f(0)|$ . [Option ID = 27914]
3. there exists  $z \in [0, 1]$  such that  $f''(z) = f(1) - f(0)$  [Option ID = 27911]
4. there exists  $z \in [0, 1]$  such that  $f''(z) = 0$ . [Option ID = 27913]

**Correct Answer :-**

- there exists  $z \in [0, 1]$  such that  $f''(z) = 0$ . [Option ID = 27913]

6)

Consider the matrix

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} \cos \theta & -\sin \theta \\ \sin \theta & \cos \theta \end{pmatrix}$$

where  $\theta \in [0, 2\pi)$ . The inner product of vectors  $v = (v_1, v_2)$  and  $w = (w_1, w_2)$  in  $\mathbb{R}^2$  is defined by  $\langle v, w \rangle \equiv v_1 w_1 + v_2 w_2$ . So, for vectors  $v$  and  $w$  in  $\mathbb{R}^2$ ,

**[Question ID = 6978]**

1.  $\langle Av, Aw \rangle > \langle v, w \rangle$  [Option ID = 27904]
2. The comparison of  $\langle Av, Aw \rangle$  and  $\langle v, w \rangle$  depends on the value of  $\theta$ . [Option ID = 27906]
3.  $\langle Av, Aw \rangle = \langle v, w \rangle$  [Option ID = 27903]
4.  $\langle Av, Aw \rangle < \langle v, w \rangle$  [Option ID = 27905]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $\langle Av, Aw \rangle = \langle v, w \rangle$  [Option ID = 27903]

7) The set  $[0, 1]$

**[Question ID = 6974]**

1. cannot be the intersection of a countable collection of sets of the form  $(a, b)$ . [Option ID = 27888]
2. is the intersection of a countable collection of sets of the form  $(a, b)$ . [Option ID = 27887]
3. is the union of a countable collection of sets of the form  $(a, b)$ . [Option ID = 27889]
4. is the union of a countable collection of sets of the form  $[a, a]$ . [Option ID = 27890]

**Correct Answer :-**

- is the intersection of a countable collection of sets of the form  $(a, b)$ . [Option ID = 27887]

8) A sequence of real numbers  $(x_n)$  converges to  $x$ . Consider the following claims:

- (I) The sequence  $(x_{n+1}/x_n)$  converges to 1.
- (II) The sequence  $(x_n + x_{n+1})$  converges to  $2x$ .

**[Question ID = 6973]**

1. Only statement II is correct. [Option ID = 27884]
2. Only Statement I is correct. [Option ID = 27883]
3. None of the statements is correct. [Option ID = 27886]
4. Both the statements are correct. [Option ID = 27885]

**Correct Answer :-**

- Only statement II is correct. [Option ID = 27884]

9)

Persons 1, 2 and 3 have to divide 12 indivisible chocolates among themselves. Each person's preference is strictly increasing in chocolates. The procedure for dividing the chocolates is as follows.

Person 1 proposes a division. Each person votes either  $Y$  (Yes) or  $N$  (No). If at least two persons vote  $Y$ , then the proposal is implemented. If not, then Person 1 is eliminated from the voting and Person 2 makes a proposal. Now, only persons 2 and 3 can vote  $Y$  or  $N$ . If at least one of them votes  $Y$ , then Person 2's proposal is implemented. Otherwise, Person 3 makes a proposal, which will be implemented.

Suppose the above procedure for dividing the chocolates is changed as follows if Person 1's proposal is rejected and Person 2 makes a proposal. If both the remaining voters, 2 and 3, vote  $Y$ , then Person 2's proposal is implemented. Otherwise, Person 3 makes a proposal, which will be implemented.

What division of chocolates will occur from a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game? (Assume that a person votes  $N$  if voting  $Y$  and  $N$  are expected to result in the same number of chocolates for that person.)

**[Question ID = 7050]**

1. 1 gets 11, 2 gets 1, 3 gets 0 [Option ID = 28193]
2. 1 gets 11, 2 gets 0, 3 gets 1 [Option ID = 28194]
3. 1 gets 12, 2 gets 0, 3 gets 0 [Option ID = 28191]
4. 1 gets 4, 2 gets 4, 3 gets 4 [Option ID = 28192]

**Correct Answer :-**

- 1 gets 11, 2 gets 1, 3 gets 0 [Option ID = 28193]

**10)** The set  $\{f_1, \dots, f_n\}$ , where each  $f_k$  is a real-valued function defined on  $\mathfrak{R}$ , is said to be linearly independent if  $c_1, \dots, c_n \in \mathfrak{R}$  and  $\sum_{k=1}^n c_k f_k(x) = 0$  for every  $x \in \mathfrak{R}$  implies  $c_1 = \dots = c_n = 0$ .

Suppose  $f_k(x) = x^k$  for all  $x \in \mathfrak{R}$  and  $k = 1, \dots, n$ . Then,

**[Question ID = 6981]**

1. the set  $\{f_1, \dots, f_n\}$  is linearly independent. [Option ID = 27917]
2. each pair of these functions is linearly independent, but larger  $n$ -tuples are not. [Option ID = 27915]  
only the subset of odd-numbered functions and the subset of even-numbered
3. functions are linearly independent. [Option ID = 27918]  
every proper subset of this set of functions is linearly independent, but the
4. whole set is not. [Option ID = 27916]

**Correct Answer :-**

- the set  $\{f_1, \dots, f_n\}$  is linearly independent. [Option ID = 27917]

**11)** Let  $f : [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$  be differentiable and suppose that  $|f'(x)| < 1$  for every  $x \in [0, 1]$ . Then, there

**[Question ID = 6979]**

1. is at least one  $c \in [0, 1]$  such that  $f(c) = c$ . [Option ID = 27907]
2. are two numbers  $c_1$  and  $c_2$  such that  $f(c_i) = c_i$  for  $i = 1, 2$ . [Option ID = 27910]
3. is exactly one  $c \in [0, 1]$  such that  $f(c) = c$ . [Option ID = 27909]
4. is at most one  $c \in [0, 1]$  such that  $f(c) = c$ . [Option ID = 27908]

**Correct Answer :-**

- is at most one  $c \in [0, 1]$  such that  $f(c) = c$ . [Option ID = 27908]

**12)** Consider a closed macroeconomy whose demand side is represented by

$$Y = C_0 + c(Y - \tau Y) - \alpha r + G_0$$

$$M_0 = KPY - \beta r$$

where  $C_0, G_0, M_0, K, c, \tau, \alpha, \beta$  are all positive constants and  $c, \tau \in (0, 1)$ .

Now suppose the government, instead of following a given money supply rule, follows an interest rate targeting policy such that the quantity of money demanded is always supplied so as to keep the interest rate fixed at given level  $r_0$ . The AD curve for this economy is

**[Question ID = 5416]**

1.  $Y = \frac{C_0 - \alpha r_0 + G_0}{1 - c(1 - \tau)}$  [Option ID = 21661]
2.  $Y = \frac{C_0 + M_0 + G_0}{1 - c(1 - \tau) + KP}$  [Option ID = 21664]
3.  $Y = \frac{C_0 + M_0 + G_0}{1 - c(1 - \tau) + \frac{1}{\beta} KP}$  [Option ID = 21662]
4.  $Y = \frac{C_0 + \frac{\alpha}{\beta} M_0 + G_0}{1 - c(1 - \tau) + \frac{\alpha}{\beta} KP}$  [Option ID = 21663]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $Y = \frac{C_0 - \alpha r_0 + G_0}{1 - c(1 - \tau)}$  [Option ID = 21661]

**13)** Consider a closed macroeconomy whose demand side is represented by

$$Y = C_0 + c(Y - \tau Y) - \alpha r + G_0$$

$$M_0 = KPY - \beta r$$

where  $C_0, G_0, M_0, K, c, \tau, \alpha, \beta$  are all positive constants and  $c, \tau \in (0, 1)$ .

The AD curve for this economy is given by

**[Question ID = 5414]**

1.  $Y = \frac{M_0 + \beta r}{KP}$  [Option ID = 21653]
2.  $Y = \frac{C_0 + \frac{\alpha}{\beta} M_0 + G_0}{1 - c(1 - \tau) + \frac{\alpha}{\beta} KP}$  [Option ID = 21655]
3.  $Y = \frac{C_0 + M_0 + G_0}{1 - c(1 - \tau) + KP}$  [Option ID = 21656]
4.  $Y = \frac{C_0 + M_0 + G_0}{1 - c(1 - \tau) + \frac{1}{\beta} KP}$  [Option ID = 21654]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $Y = \frac{C_0 + \frac{\alpha}{\beta} M_0 + G_0}{1 - c(1 - \tau) + \frac{\alpha}{\beta} KP}$  [Option ID = 21655]

**14)** Consider a closed macroeconomy whose demand side is represented by

$$Y = C_0 + c(Y - \tau Y) - \alpha r + G_0$$
$$M_0 = KPY - \beta r$$

where  $C_0, G_0, M_0, K, c, \tau, \alpha, \beta$  are all positive constants and  $c, \tau \in (0, 1)$ .

Suppose there an increase in the interest sensitivity of the IS curve (parameter  $\alpha$ ), which is accompanied by an increase in the interest sensitivity of the LM curve (parameter  $\beta$ ) by exactly the same proportion. As a result,

**[Question ID = 5415]**

1. the AD curve will be steeper but there will be no shift of the entire curve [Option ID = 21659]
2. the entire AD curve will shift to the right and it will also be steeper [Option ID = 21658]
3. the entire AD curve will shift to the right with no change in its slope [Option ID = 21657]
4. there will be no change in the AD curve (neither any change in its slope, nor a shift) [Option ID = 21660]

**Correct Answer :-**

- there will be no change in the AD curve (neither any change in its slope, nor a shift) [Option ID = 21660]

**15)** In a multiple regression model involving three right-hand-side variables with 105 observations estimated using OLS, the researcher needs to decide whether to include a fourth right-hand-side variable or not. The residual sum of squares is 250 when four variables are included and is 300 when three variables are included. Some critical values of the  $F$ -table (with  $\alpha = 0.05$ ) are:  $F(1, 100) = 3.89$ ,  $F(2, 100) = 3.09$ ,  $F(3, 100) = 2.70$ ,  $F(4, 100) = 2.46$  and  $F(5, 100) = 2.31$ .

This means when the fourth variable is included, the fit of the regression

**[Question ID = 5407]**

1. there is insufficient information to make a determination about fit [Option ID = 21628]
2. worsens significantly [Option ID = 21626]
3. has no significant change [Option ID = 21627]
4. improves significantly [Option ID = 21625]

**Correct Answer :-**

- improves significantly [Option ID = 21625]

- 16)** For a variable  $x$  the standard error of the sample mean is calculated as 20 when samples of size 25 are taken and as 10 when samples of size 100 are taken. A quadrupling of sample size has only halved the error. What must be the value of the standard error of  $x$ ?

**[Question ID = 5408]**

1. 1000 [Option ID = 21629]
2. 500 [Option ID = 21630]
3. 100 [Option ID = 21632]
4. 377.5 [Option ID = 21631]

**Correct Answer :-**

- 100 [Option ID = 21632]

- 17)** Suppose a consumer lives for two periods and chooses consumptions  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  to maximise utility

$$u(C_t) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \left( C_t^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} - 1 \right)$$

Future consumption is discounted by  $\rho$ . The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption between the two periods is

**[Question ID = 5424]**

1.  $\sigma$  [Option ID = 21694]
2. 1 [Option ID = 21695]
3.  $(\sigma - 1)/\sigma$  [Option ID = 21693]
4.  $\sigma/(\sigma - 1)$  [Option ID = 21696]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $\sigma$  [Option ID = 21694]

**18)**

Consider the game

	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>R</i>
<i>U</i>	(2, 0)	(3, 3)	(0, 0)
<i>M</i>	(1, -1)	(0, 0)	(1, 0)
<i>D</i>	(4, -4)	(2, 2)	(1, 1)

where the row player's payoff is given first, followed by the column player's payoff. Which of the following statements is **false**?

**[Question ID = 5426]**

1. There is a Nash equilibrium of this game in which the column player plays a strictly dominated strategy. [Option ID = 21704]
2. Column player has a strictly dominated strategy. [Option ID = 21702]
3. Row player has a weakly dominated strategy. [Option ID = 21701]
4. There is a Nash equilibrium of this game in which both players play weakly dominated strategies. [Option ID = 21703]

**Correct Answer :-**

- There is a Nash equilibrium of this game in which the column player plays a strictly dominated strategy. [Option ID = 21704]

**19)** In a multiple regression model, the Durbin-Watson test statistic is 1.3, while the critical lower and upper values are 1.5 and 1.7 respectively. This implies that

**[Question ID = 5406]**

1. There is positive autocorrelation. [Option ID = 21624]
2. There is no positive autocorrelation. [Option ID = 21623]
3. The test is inconclusive about autocorrelation. [Option ID = 21622]
4. There is heteroscedasticity but no autocorrelation. [Option ID = 21621]

**Correct Answer :-**

- There is positive autocorrelation. [Option ID = 21624]

**20)** Consider the model  $y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \epsilon$ , estimated using OLS. Which of the following will lead to a higher  $\text{Var}(\hat{\beta}_2)$ ?

- (i) Smaller sample size
- (ii) Less variation in  $X_2$
- (iii) More variation in  $\epsilon$
- (iv) Higher correlation between  $X_1$  and  $X_2$ .

The correct answer is:

**[Question ID = 5405]**

1. (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) [Option ID = 21620]
2. (ii), (iii) and (iv) [Option ID = 21619]
3. (ii) and (iii) [Option ID = 21617]
4. (iii) and (iv) [Option ID = 21618]

**Correct Answer :-**

- (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) [Option ID = 21620]

- 21)** Consider an exchange economy with two agents, 1 and 2, and two goods,  $X$  and  $Y$ . Each agent's consumption set is  $\mathbb{R}_+^2$ . The endowments of agents 1 and 2 are  $(10, 1)$  and  $(0, 9)$  respectively. (In any commodity bundle, the first entry is a quantity of  $X$  and the second one is a quantity of  $Y$ .)
- If  $a > c$ , or  $a = c$  and  $b > d$ , then Agent 1 strictly prefers bundle  $(a, b)$  to  $(c, d)$ .  
 If  $b > d$ , or  $b = d$  and  $a > c$ , then Agent 2 strictly prefers bundle  $(a, b)$  to  $(c, d)$ .

Which of the following allocations is an efficient allocation?

**[Question ID = 7048]**

1. 1 gets  $(5, 5)$  and 2 gets  $(5, 5)$  [Option ID = 28185]
2. 1 gets  $(10, 1)$  and 2 gets  $(0, 9)$  [Option ID = 28183]
3. 1 gets  $(10, 10)$  and 2 gets  $(0, 0)$  [Option ID = 28184]
4. All of the above [Option ID = 28186]

**Correct Answer :-**

- 1 gets  $(10, 1)$  and 2 gets  $(0, 9)$  [Option ID = 28183]

- 22)** Consider a country with two citizens, 1 and 2. The government is considering a scheme that will cost 100. The government does not know the true benefits of the scheme to the citizens, say  $B_1$  and  $B_2$ , and must decide whether to implement the scheme on the basis of their reported benefits, say  $R_1$  and  $R_2$ . It will implement the scheme if and only if  $R_1 + R_2 \geq 100$ . If it is implemented, the government will impose tax  $100 - R_2$  on person 1 and tax  $100 - R_1$  on person 2. Each citizen's reported benefit seeks to maximize the difference between her true benefit (known only to her) and the tax that must be paid if and only if the scheme is implemented. The optimal choices of  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  must be such that

**[Question ID = 5438]**

1.  $R_1 < B_1$  and  $R_2 < B_2$  [Option ID = 21751]
2. Nothing systematic can be said about  $R_1$  and  $R_2$ . [Option ID = 21752]
3.  $R_1 = B_1$  and  $R_2 = B_2$  [Option ID = 21750]
4.  $R_1 > B_1$  and  $R_2 > B_2$  [Option ID = 21749]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $R_1 = B_1$  and  $R_2 = B_2$  [Option ID = 21750]

**23)** Consider a Solovian economy with the aggregate production function  $Y_t = K_t^{1/2} N_t^{1/2}$ . The initial size of the population is 100 and the initial capital stock is given by 9 units. The entire output produced in each period is distributed to the households as factor incomes (since households are the owners of the capital stock and labour at any time  $t$ ), who consume half of their income and save the rest. All savings are automatically invested which augment the capital stock available for production over time. Population does not grow and there is 100% depreciation of capital stock within one period.

The corresponding steady state value of aggregate output is

**[Question ID = 6983]**

1. 30 [Option ID = 27926]
2. 50 [Option ID = 27924]
3. 5 [Option ID = 27925]
4. 10 [Option ID = 27923]

**Correct Answer :-**

- 50 [Option ID = 27924]

**24)** Consider a Solovian economy with the aggregate production function  $Y_t = K_t^{1/2} N_t^{1/2}$ . The initial size of the population is 100 and the initial capital stock is given by 9 units. The entire output produced in each period is distributed to the households as factor incomes (since households are the owners of the capital stock and labour at any time  $t$ ), who consume half of their income and save the rest. All savings are automatically invested which augment the capital stock available for production over time. Population does not grow and there is 100% depreciation of capital stock within one period.

The steady state value of aggregate capital stock is

**[Question ID = 6982]**

1. 9 [Option ID = 27920]
2. 25 [Option ID = 27921]
3. 2.5 [Option ID = 27922]
4. 10 [Option ID = 27919]

**Correct Answer :-**

- 25 [Option ID = 27921]

**25)**

Suppose  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  are observed completion times of an experiment with values in  $[0, 1]$ . Each of these random variables is uniformly distributed on  $[0, 1]$ . If  $Y$  is the maximum observed completion time, then the mean of  $Y$  is

**[Question ID = 5401]**

1.  $n/2(n+1)$  [Option ID = 21602]
2.  $2n/(n+1)$  [Option ID = 21604]
3.  $[n/(n+1)]^2$  [Option ID = 21601]
4.  $n/(n+1)$  [Option ID = 21603]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $n/(n+1)$  [Option ID = 21603]

**26)** Consider the function

$$f(x, y) = \begin{cases} xy/(x^2 + y^2), & \text{if } (x, y) \neq (0, 0) \\ 0 & \text{if } (x, y) = (0, 0) \end{cases}$$

**[Question ID = 5398]**

1.  $f$  is differentiable at  $(0, 0)$  and its partial derivatives are not both 0 at  $(0, 0)$ . [Option ID = 21591]
2.  $f$  is not differentiable at  $(0, 0)$  and its partial derivatives are both 0 at  $(0, 0)$ . [Option ID = 21590]
3.  $f$  is differentiable at  $(0, 0)$  and its partial derivatives are both 0 at  $(0, 0)$ . [Option ID = 21589]
4.  $f$  is not differentiable at  $(0, 0)$  and its partial derivatives do not exist at  $(0, 0)$ . [Option ID = 21592]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $f$  is not differentiable at  $(0, 0)$  and its partial derivatives are both 0 at  $(0, 0)$ . [Option ID = 21590]

**27)** Suppose we have estimated  $y = 10 + 1.5x + 4D$ , where  $y$  is earnings,  $x$  is experience and  $D$  is 0 for females and 1 for males. If we had coded the dummy as  $-1$  for females and 1 for males, the new estimated coefficients (in the same order) would have been:

**[Question ID = 5412]**

1. 12, 1.5,  $-2$  [Option ID = 21648]
2. 12, 1.5, 2 [Option ID = 21647]
3. 14, 1.5,  $-4$  [Option ID = 21645]
4. 10, 1.5, 4 [Option ID = 21646]

**Correct Answer :-**

- 12, 1.5, 2 [Option ID = 21647]

**28)**

Which of the following is/are the consequence(s) of including an irrelevant variable in a multiple linear regression model?

- (i) The variances of the OLS coefficients may be larger
- (ii) The OLS coefficients will be biased unless the irrelevant variable is orthogonal to the other included variables
- (iii) The variances of the OLS coefficients will be unaffected.

The correct answer is:

**[Question ID = 5404]**

- 1. (i) only [Option ID = 21615]
- 2. (ii) and (iii) [Option ID = 21614]
- 3. (iii) only [Option ID = 21616]
- 4. (i) and (ii) [Option ID = 21613]

**Correct Answer :-**

- (i) only [Option ID = 21615]

**29)** Suppose  $Y$  is a random variable with uniform distribution on the interval  $[-\pi/2, \pi/2]$ . The value of the (cumulative) distribution function of the random variable  $X = \sin Y$  at  $x \in [-1, 1]$  is

**[Question ID = 5403]**

- 1.  $\sin^{-1}(x)/\pi + 1/2$  [Option ID = 21611]
- 2.  $\sin^{-1}(x) + \pi/2$  [Option ID = 21610]
- 3.  $\sin^{-1}(x) + \pi$  [Option ID = 21609]
- 4.  $\sin^{-1}(x)/\pi + \pi/2$  [Option ID = 21612]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $\sin^{-1}(x)/\pi + 1/2$  [Option ID = 21611]

**30)** A student is answering a multiple-choice examination. Suppose a question has  $m$  possible answers. The student knows the correct answer with probability  $p$ . If the student knows the correct answer, she picks it with probability 1; otherwise, she picks randomly from the choices with probability  $1/m$  each. Given that the student picked the correct answer, the probability that she knew the correct answer is

**[Question ID = 5402]**

- 1.  $p/[1 + (1 - p)m]$  [Option ID = 21608]
- 2.  $p/[1 + (m - 1)p]$  [Option ID = 21607]
- 3.  $mp/[1 + (1 - p)m]$  [Option ID = 21606]
- 4.  $mp/[1 + (m - 1)p]$  [Option ID = 21605]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $mp/[1 + (m - 1)p]$  [Option ID = 21605]

31) Consider the game

$$\begin{array}{cc}
 & \begin{array}{cc} L & R \end{array} \\
 \begin{array}{c} U \\ D \end{array} & \begin{pmatrix} x, x & z, y \\ y, z & y, y \end{pmatrix}
 \end{array}$$

where the row player's payoff is given first, followed by the column player's payoff. This game has only one Nash equilibrium when

[Question ID = 5427]

1.  $x > y > z$  [Option ID = 21705]
2.  $x < y < z$  [Option ID = 21706]
3.  $y = z = x$  [Option ID = 21708]
4.  $y > z > x$  [Option ID = 21707]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $y > z > x$  [Option ID = 21707]

32) Consider an economy where there is no capital. Production of the final good is carried out in each period using a linear production function that uses only labour. The production technology is specified as follows:

$$Y_t = A_t(1 - \lambda_t)L_0$$

where  $L_0$  is the constant labour force in the economy,  $1 - \lambda_t$  is the proportion of labour force engaged in final goods production and  $A_t$  is the state of technology in period  $t$ . The index of technology  $A_t$  changes over time depending on the proportion

of the labour force engaged in R&D, which is  $\lambda_t$ . The evolution of technology in the R&D sector is determined by the equation

$$\frac{dA}{dt} = \lambda_t L_0 A_t$$

where the initial  $A_0$  is a positive constant.

Now suppose that the relative price of the new technologies generated in the R&D sector in terms of the final commodity is unity. Also suppose the labour across two sectors are employed in such a way that the value of marginal product of labour across the two sectors are identical. In this case, the equilibrium value of  $\lambda_t$  will be

[Question ID = 5418]

1.  $\lambda_0$  [Option ID = 21670]
2.  $\frac{1}{2}$  [Option ID = 21671]

3.  $\frac{1}{2}$  [Option ID = 21669]
4.  $(1 - \lambda_0)$  [Option ID = 21672]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $\frac{1}{2}$  [Option ID = 21671]

**33)** Consider an economy where there is no capital. Production of the final good is carried out in each period using a linear production function that uses only labour. The production technology is specified as follows:

$$Y_t = A_t(1 - \lambda_t)L_0$$

where  $L_0$  is the constant labour force in the economy,  $1 - \lambda_t$  is the proportion of labour force engaged in final goods production and  $A_t$  is the state of technology in period  $t$ . The index of technology  $A_t$  changes over time depending on the proportion

of the labour force engaged in R&D, which is  $\lambda_t$ . The evolution of technology in the R&D sector is determined by the equation

$$\frac{dA}{dt} = \lambda_t L_0 A_t$$

where the initial  $A_0$  is a positive constant.

For any exogenously given value of  $\lambda_t = \lambda_0$ , the long run balanced growth rate in this economy is

**[Question ID = 5417]**

1.  $(1 - \lambda_0)L_0$  [Option ID = 21667]
2.  $(1 - \lambda_0)$  [Option ID = 21668]
3.  $\lambda_0$  [Option ID = 21665]
4.  $\lambda_0 L_0$  [Option ID = 21666]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $\lambda_0 L_0$  [Option ID = 21666]

**34)** Duopolist firms 1 and 2 sell a homogeneous good in a market with demand function  $Q = 100 - 2P$ , where  $Q$  is the quantity demanded at price  $P$ . Firms 1 and 2 have constant marginal costs of 0 and 30 respectively. The firms simultaneously announce prices and consumers buy from the firm whose price is lower. If the firms choose the same price, all the consumers buy from firm 1. Firm 1's equilibrium price is

**[Question ID = 5435]**

1. 30 [Option ID = 21740]

2. 0 [Option ID = 21737]
3. 25 [Option ID = 21739]
4. 20 [Option ID = 21738]

**Correct Answer :-**

- 25 [Option ID = 21739]

**35)** Voters arrive at a social ranking of alternatives by consulting a “holy book”: the social ranking is the ranking found in this book. Which of Arrow’s axioms defining an attractive preference aggregation method is violated by this method?

**[Question ID = 5428]**

1. Independence of irrelevant alternatives [Option ID = 21711]
2. Non-dictatorship [Option ID = 21712]
3. Unrestricted domain [Option ID = 21709]
4. The Pareto principle [Option ID = 21710]

**Correct Answer :-**

- The Pareto principle [Option ID = 21710]

**36)** A consumer weakly prefers a basket  $(a_1, a_2, a_3)$  to a basket  $(b_1, b_2, b_3)$  if

$$a_1 \geq b_1, \quad a_1 + a_2 \geq b_1 + b_2 \quad \text{and} \quad a_1 + a_2 + a_3 \geq b_1 + b_2 + b_3$$

Which of the following statements about this preference is **false**?

**[Question ID = 5430]**

1. It is transitive. [Option ID = 21718]
2. It is monotonic. [Option ID = 21719]
3. It is continuous. [Option ID = 21720]
4. It is complete. [Option ID = 21717]

**Correct Answer :-**

- It is complete. [Option ID = 21717]

**37)** Suppose the economy-wide union sets wage for employed workers by  $W = P^e(Z - \alpha u)$  with unemployment rate  $u$  and labour force of the economy  $L$ . The producer levies price over wage  $W$  with mark-up  $m$  as  $P = (1 + m)W$ . If each employed worker produces one unit of output  $Y$ , then the aggregate supply function is

**[Question ID = 5425]**

1.  $P = -P^e(1 + m)(Z - 1 + \alpha Y/L)$  [Option ID = 21699]

2.  $P = P^e(1 + m)(Z - 1 + \alpha Y/L)$  [Option ID = 21700]
3.  $P = -P^e(1 + m)(Z - \alpha + \alpha Y/L)$  [Option ID = 21698]
4.  $P = P^e(1 + m)(Z - \alpha + \alpha Y/L)$  [Option ID = 21697]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $P = P^e(1 + m)(Z - \alpha + \alpha Y/L)$  [Option ID = 21697]

**38)** Consider the following regression model

$$y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 x_{1i} + \alpha_2 x_{2i} + u_i$$

Suppose a researcher is interested in conducting White's heteroscedasticity test using the residuals from an estimation of the above equation. What would be the most appropriate form for the auxiliary regression?

**[Question ID = 5413]**

1.  $u_i^2 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{1i} + \gamma_2 x_{2i} + \gamma_3 x_{1i}^2 + \gamma_4 x_{2i}^2 + \gamma_5 x_{1i} x_{2i} + \nu_i$  [Option ID = 21650]
2.  $u_i^2 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 u_{i-1} + \nu_i$  [Option ID = 21649]
3.  $u_i^2 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{1i} + \gamma_2 x_{2i} + \gamma_3 x_{1i}^2 + \gamma_4 x_{2i}^2 + \nu_i$  [Option ID = 21651]
4.  $u_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 u_{i-1} + \nu_i$  [Option ID = 21652]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $u_i^2 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{1i} + \gamma_2 x_{2i} + \gamma_3 x_{1i}^2 + \gamma_4 x_{2i}^2 + \gamma_5 x_{1i} x_{2i} + \nu_i$  [Option ID = 21650]

**39)** Suppose you have run the following regression:

$$y = \alpha + \beta x + \gamma \text{Urban} + \theta \text{Immigrant} + \delta \text{Urban} * \text{Immigrant} + \epsilon$$

where Urban is a dummy indicating that the person lives in a city rather than a rural area, Immigrant is a dummy indicating that the person is an immigrant rather than a native. The coefficient  $\theta$  is interpreted as the *ceteris paribus* difference in  $y$  between

**[Question ID = 5411]**

1. A rural immigrant and a rural native [Option ID = 21642]
2. None of the above [Option ID = 21644]
3. An immigrant and a native [Option ID = 21641]
4. An urban immigrant and an urban native [Option ID = 21643]

**Correct Answer :-**

- A rural immigrant and a rural native [Option ID = 21642]

**40)**

Consider a Solovian economy with the aggregate production function  $Y_t = K_t^{1/2} N_t^{1/2}$ . The initial size of the population is 100 and the initial capital stock is given by 9 units. The entire output produced in each period is distributed to the households as factor incomes (since households are the owners of the capital stock and labour at any time  $t$ ), who consume half of their income and save the rest. All savings are automatically invested which augment the capital stock available for production over time. Population does not grow and there is 100% depreciation of capital stock within one period.

The corresponding steady state value of aggregate consumption is

**[Question ID = 6984]**

1. 50 [Option ID = 27928]
2. 10 [Option ID = 27929]
3. 30 [Option ID = 27930]
4. 25 [Option ID = 27927]

**Correct Answer :-**

- 25 [Option ID = 27927]

**41)** Consider a Solovian economy with the aggregate production function  $Y_t = K_t^{1/2} N_t^{1/2}$ . The initial size of the population is 100 and the initial capital stock is given by 9 units. The entire output produced in each period is distributed to the households as factor incomes (since households are the owners of the capital stock and labour at any time  $t$ ), who consume half of their income and save the rest. All savings are automatically invested which augment the capital stock available for production over time. Population does not grow and there is 100% depreciation of capital stock within one period.

Suppose households were free to choose their savings rate. If they wanted to maximise the steady state level of aggregate consumption, the savings rate they would choose is

**[Question ID = 6985]**

1.  $1/2$  [Option ID = 27934]
2.  $1/5$  [Option ID = 27933]
3.  $1/4$  [Option ID = 27931]
4.  $1/10$  [Option ID = 27932]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $1/2$  [Option ID = 27934]

**42)**

Consider an exchange economy with two agents, 1 and 2, and two goods,  $X$  and  $Y$ . Each agent's consumption set is  $\mathbb{R}_+^2$ . Given bundles  $(a, b), (c, d) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$  such that  $(a, b) \geq (c, d)$  and  $(a, b) \neq (c, d)$ , agent 1 strictly prefers  $(a, b)$ . (In any commodity bundle, the first entry is a quantity of  $X$  and the second one is a quantity of  $Y$ .) Consider the following claims: In a competitive equilibrium for this economy,

- (I) both prices must be positive, and
- (II) the sum of the allocations to 1 and 2 must equal the sum of their endowments.

Which of the following statements is correct?

**[Question ID = 5433]**

1. I and II are true [Option ID = 21729]
2. I is true, but II is false [Option ID = 21731]
3. I and II are false [Option ID = 21730]
4. I is false, but II is true [Option ID = 21732]

**Correct Answer :-**

- I and II are true [Option ID = 21729]

**43)** Consider a Solovian economy with the aggregate production function  $Y_t = K_t^{1/2} N_t^{1/2}$ . The initial size of the population is 100 and the initial capital stock is given by 9 units. The entire output produced in each period is distributed to the households as factor incomes (since households are the owners of the capital stock and labour at any time  $t$ ), who consume half of their income and save the rest. All savings are automatically invested which augment the capital stock available for production over time. Population does not grow and there is 100% depreciation of capital stock within one period.

In the previous problem, where the households choose their savings rate, at that savings rate, the steady state value of the aggregate capital stock is

**[Question ID = 6986]**

1. 25 [Option ID = 27937]
2. 2.5 [Option ID = 27938]
3. 10 [Option ID = 27935]
4. 9 [Option ID = 27936]

**Correct Answer :-**

**44)** A monopolist faces a demand function  $D(p) = \alpha - p$  and cost function  $C(q) = cq$ . She can advertise her product to increase demand. Advertisement level  $\theta$  costs  $\theta^2/2$  and it shifts the demand function by  $\theta$ , i.e., the new demand function is  $D(p) = \alpha + \theta - p$ . The monopolist's profit is

**[Question ID = 5429]**

1.  $(\alpha - c)^2/4$  [Option ID = 21714]

2.  $(\alpha - c)^2/2$  [Option ID = 21713]
3.  $(\alpha - c - \theta)^2/4$  [Option ID = 21716]
4.  $(\alpha - \theta)^2$  [Option ID = 21715]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $(\alpha - c)^2/2$  [Option ID = 21713]

**45)** Persons 1, 2 and 3 have to divide 12 indivisible chocolates among themselves. Each person's preference is strictly increasing in chocolates. The procedure for dividing the chocolates is as follows.

Person 1 proposes a division. Each person votes either *Y* (Yes) or *N* (No). If at least two persons vote *Y*, then the proposal is implemented. If not, then Person 1 is eliminated from the voting and Person 2 makes a proposal. Now, only persons 2 and 3 can vote *Y* or *N*. If at least one of them votes *Y*, then Person 2's proposal is implemented. Otherwise, Person 3 makes a proposal, which will be implemented.

- i. What division of chocolates will occur from a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game? (Assume that a person votes *N* if voting *Y* and *N* are expected to result in the same number of chocolates for that person.)

**[Question ID = 7049]**

1. 1 gets 12, 2 gets 0, 3 gets 0 [Option ID = 28187]
2. 1 gets 11, 2 gets 1, 3 gets 0 [Option ID = 28189]
3. 1 gets 11, 2 gets 0, 3 gets 1 [Option ID = 28190]
4. 1 gets 4, 2 gets 4, 3 gets 4 [Option ID = 28188]

**Correct Answer :-**

- 1 gets 11, 2 gets 0, 3 gets 1 [Option ID = 28190]

**46)** Consider the following game. Player 1 moves first and chooses *L* or *R*. If she plays *R*, the game ends and the payoffs are (10, 0). If she plays *L*, then player 2 moves and chooses either *L* or *R*. If he plays *R*, the game ends and the payoffs are (0, 20). If he plays *L*, then player 1 moves and chooses either *L* or *R*. The game ends in both cases. If player 1 chooses *L*, then the payoffs are (30, 30). If she chooses *R*, then the payoffs are (40, 0). This game

**[Question ID = 5434]**

1. has three subgame perfect equilibria [Option ID = 21734]
2. has a unique Nash equilibrium [Option ID = 21736]
3. has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which 2 plays *L* [Option ID = 21733]
4. has a unique Nash equilibrium outcome [Option ID = 21735]

**Correct Answer :-**

- has a unique Nash equilibrium outcome [Option ID = 21735]

**47)**

If the function  $f : \mathbb{R}^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is concave, then

**[Question ID = 5399]**

1.  $\{(x, r) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \times \mathbb{R} \mid f(x) < r\}$  is convex. [Option ID = 21594]
2.  $\{(x, r) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \times \mathbb{R} \mid f(x) = r\}$  is convex. [Option ID = 21596]
3.  $\{(x, r) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \times \mathbb{R} \mid f(x) \geq r\}$  is convex. [Option ID = 21595]
4.  $\{(x, r) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \times \mathbb{R} \mid f(x) \leq r\}$  is convex. [Option ID = 21593]

**Correct Answer :-**

- $\{(x, r) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \times \mathbb{R} \mid f(x) \geq r\}$  is convex. [Option ID = 21595]

**48)** Let  $\mathbb{R}$  be the set of real numbers. A subset of  $\mathbb{R}$ , say  $E$ , is said to be open if, for every  $x \in E$ , there exists  $r > 0$ , such that  $(x - r, x + r)$  is a subset of  $E$ . Then,

**[Question ID = 5400]**

1.  $E_1 \cap \dots \cap E_n$  is open, for every collection of open sets  $\{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$ . [Option ID = 21599]
2.  $E_1 \cup \dots \cup E_n$  is open, for every collection of open sets  $\{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$ . [Option ID = 21598]
3.  $\emptyset$  is open. [Option ID = 21597]
4. all of the above are true. [Option ID = 21600]

**Correct Answer :-**

- all of the above are true. [Option ID = 21600]

**49)** You have 100 observations on  $y$ , with average value 15, and on  $x$ , with average value 8. From an OLS regression, you have estimated the slope on  $x$  to be 2. Your estimate of the mean of  $y$  conditioned on  $x$  is

**[Question ID = 5410]**

1. 15 [Option ID = 21637]
2. 17 [Option ID = 21639]
3. None of the above [Option ID = 21640]
4. 16 [Option ID = 21638]

**Correct Answer :-**

- None of the above [Option ID = 21640]

**50)** Suppose your data produces the regression result  $y = 10 + 3x$ . Scale  $y$  by multiplying observations by 0.9 and do not scale  $x$ . The new intercept and slope estimates will be

**[Question ID = 5409]**

1. 10 and 3 [Option ID = 21633]
2. 9 and 3 [Option ID = 21634]
3. 9 and 2.7 [Option ID = 21636]
4. 10 and 2.7 [Option ID = 21635]

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**Correct Answer :-**

- 9 and 2.7 [Option ID = 21636]
-